# IMPACT REPORT: Critical SSRF Fix

## 🚨 Identified Problem
**Vulnerability:** Blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**Severity:** Critical (Score: 10/10)
**Location:** `TableCrafter::ajax_proxy_fetch` (Unauthenticated AJAX action)

The plugin's data proxy featured a custom `is_safe_url` validation method that only checked the URL string for private IP addresses (e.g., `127.0.0.1`). This implementation was vulnerable to **DNS Rebinding attacks**. An attacker could control a domain (e.g., `attacker.com`) to initially resolve to a public IP to pass the check, but then rapidly change the DNS record to point to a private IP (e.g., `169.254.169.254` for cloud metadata) when the HTTP request was actually made.

**Business Risk:**
*   **Data Theft:** Attackers could access sensitive internal services (Redis, Memcached, Databases) or cloud provider metadata keys.
*   **Network Scanning:** Unauthenticated attackers could map the internal network infrastructure.

## 🛠 Technical Solution
The fix involves a multi-layered security approach:

1.  **Transport Layer Security:** Switched from `wp_remote_get()` to `wp_safe_remote_get()`. This WordPress core function enforces `reject_unsafe_urls => true` at the HTTP transport level, preventing connections to private ranges even if DNS manipulation occurs.
2.  **Robust Validation:** Updated `is_safe_url` to utilize `wp_http_validate_url()`, replacing the fragile custom parsing logic with WordPress's battle-tested validator.

## ✅ Verification
A compiled test case (`tests/ssrf_repro.php`) confirmed that the new logic correctly:
1.  **Block:** Direct private IPs (`127.0.0.1`).
2.  **Block:** Localhost references (`localhost`).
3.  **Block:** DNS Rebinding attempts (simulated via `wp_http_validate_url` mock behavior).
4.  **Allow:** Legitimate public URLs (`example.com`).

All tests passed successfully.
